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The Honorable Justices of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

x

Clerk. Supremo Court, Utah

Klein v. Klein
Case No, 13994

To the Honorable Justices:
Mr. Robert D. Klein has this date submitted to me for my
review his self-written Petition for Rehearing. Said statement
was prepared by Mr. Klein without the assistance of myself or
any other member of my office. His statement is solely his own
and without any correction or suggestion from me.
I believe the matters set forth in Mr. Klein's petition
to be of considerable relevance and to warrant your attention
and review.
Mr. Klein's petition and statement are submitted by him
alone and with my consent as his counsel. Should you have any
questions concerning this matter, I shall be happy to discuss
them at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
HATCH S PLUMB

OGH/sa
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Appellant,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs.
MARY AVALON KLEIN,

Appeal No. 13994

Defendant and
Respondent.
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myself in this state, I would beg the Court to address itself
to some questions and aspects of this case that will enable me
to put the matter to rest psychologically and with a good conscience, knowing that I made every effort to understand and
accept what has happened.
Tn personally making this request for rehearing and/or
reconsideration, I would like to express my appreciation for
my attorney and for his efforts in my behalf.
I wish to be able to accept the Court's judgment,
and it is for this reason, a kind of npeace of mind11 if you
will, that I seek a rational explanation of issues that to me
seem to have been overlooked.
Upon careful analysis of what has been written in
the affirmation ruling, I see no tendencies or inclinations that
suggest the possibility of reconsideration.

Nevertheless, in

view of my belief in myself, and my own conclusions, I must
speak to the issues as I, being their principle author, know
them.

The affirmative and concurring view seems to say that

by my stipulation I nconsentedf? to a judgment.

Although I dis-

agree with Judge Taylor, his court has executed an order confirming that I have given my "consent".

There is of course a dis-

senting viewpoint.
In the spirit of that nclose proximity observation",
does the lower court have any responsibility to listen to the
timely pleadings of a litigant who makes an effort to explain
why he believes he cannot legally and/or practically comply with
a given stipulation?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Consider the following five points:
(One)

The alleged $1,748,809.98 evaluation of the

marital estate is based upon the additional inclusion and not
necessarily the reevaluation of properties.

The total appraised

value of these inclusionary properties approximates $1,200,000.
Three of the additionally included properties were not included
in the Faux decree.

They are:

(1)

Holidair Lands, Inc. [Sandberg property)

C2)

Award Homes, Inc. stock

(3)

The Seegmiller property

Two of the above-mentioned properties were and are
not now owned by myself.

They are:

(1)

The Sandberg property

(2)

Award Homes stock

Part of my understanding of the ngoings on" consisted
of the grasping and understanding of facts like these.
n

Is it

proper n or correct law for properties that I donTt own to be

included in the evaluation of a marital estate?

Should I or should

I not advise the court of my stipulating to such an inaccuracy?
Two of these inaccurate factors of ownership exist today and have
been confirmed by the appellant court's affirmation.

Is the

Court aware of this?
The Seegmiller property appears to me to have been
acquired under circumstances that are deserving of some consideration.

When I bought it I thought I was doing so because it was

awarded to me and that Faux had wanted me to be able to go on

-3-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and practice my occupation of land developer.
I thought Faux awarded this property to me.

Because of this,
The effect of this

judgment has the opposite result and actually, if included as
a part of the marital estate, has the effect of punishing me
for taking the bold action to acquire it. Would the Court please
address itself to this acquisition.

Should it actually have

been included as a part of the marital estate or not?

For what

reasons?
(Two)

Another "goings on" that I came to comprehend

within hours after my "so spoken by Robert D. Klein" stipulation
was that Holidair Lands, Inc., a corporation, with a 17.5%
minority stockholder owner, had placed upon it a judgment, even
though it was not a party to a divorce action.

As an individual

I had stipulated to pay approximately $60,000 of Holidair assets
at the expense of a minority stockholder interest.

This to me

seemed to be in conflict with my fiduciary responsibility as
President of Holidair Lands.

Question:

Is this a proper finding?

Should I or should I not make an effort to point this out to
the Court?
so.

To me I felt I wanted to do so and that I had to do

Granted, that Judge Taylor may not have understood this

as I pleaded with him to permit me to withdraw my stipulation,
but I was nevertheless explicit that I could not give my consent
to such a legitimate legal conflict of interest.

This incon-

sistency has not been dispensed with by the Court through its
present action.

Not my then attorney, or the Defendant's attorney,

or the Court pointed this out to me.

I discovered this on my

own and made an effort to withdraw my consent on my own, in part
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because of this.

I really don't understand how I can stipulate

to such an inconsistency.

No one it seemed would listen to me,

and now in the present action I am suffering a frustration in
this particular.

This is a real puzzlement for me.

I just don't

understand what to do or how to comply with this aspect of the
imposed judgment.

This aspect of the judgment will in all likeli-

hood precipitate a third party lawsuit.
[Three)

Another inconsistency that seems to me to

be unenforceable relates to my agreeing to deliver 14 apartments,
7 of which were not and are not now owned by myself.

I have

actually made the effort to acquire these 7 additional apartments, but even at this time I have not been able to do so
owing (1) to my mother's control of the Award Homes, Inc. stock,
and (2) owing to the loyalty of her attorneys, who assisted her
in preparing the trust that apparently this consent judgment
disregards.

By the terms of the judgment, I find my situation

to be that I must ask my mother, who has already contributed
$50,000 from her savings toward the acquisition of the marital
estate, to ask three trustees to relinquish stock that she had
put in trust for her grandchildren.

I am one of those trustees,

and the other two are Leo Jardine, who is my mother's attorney,
as well as my own, and Harvard Hinton, a longstanding friend of
our family.
This aspect of the judgment, if insisted upon, will
in all likelihood produce a third party lawsuit.

It illustrates

further my conundrum and why I made a timely effort to be absolved
from stipulating thereto.

Is it the intent of this Court to
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ratify that aspect of the presently imposed judgment?

Actually,

in this connection, while the facts are true, the matter was
not discussed in the briefs although the record does address
itself to the issue herein outlined.

A third party lawsuit is

likely to result from this issue if executed in its present form.
(Four) Another potential third party lawsuit that this
judgment can and will probably induce is related to the security
measure of delivering Major Enterprises stock to the court for
its disposal. Mr. O'Brien has exercised an option entitlement
and is in fact acquiring Major stock consistent with the provisions and terms of the stockholder agreement.
In court I agreed to deliver this stock to the lower
court, not fully taking into account the restrictive provisions
of the stockholders agreement.

I have made an effort to comply

with this aspect of the judgment and tried to elucidate upon
this through my attorney in oral argument but was not afforded
the opportunity to discuss this matter because the Court disregarded the defendant's Major Enterprise stock offer and our
acceptance of same, which again is also confusing to me in its
incompleteness.
The nconsentn judgment has not disposed of this matter,
and again this is a matter that I tried to elaborate on to Judge
Taylor, who preferred not to listen, I suppose in accordance
with his responsibilities as a judge.

But I nevertheless with-

drew my consent to comply with this aspect even as I will have to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

do so at such time as I am requested to make delivery.
not in my power then

It was

when I stipulated to do so, and I don't

believe it is in my power now to comply.

Does the present Court

affirmation effectively dispense with this delivery of stock
issue?

Again, I tried to tell the lower court this when I

withdrew my "consent" to the stipulation.

Is this a proper

and reasonable judgment conclusion?
In summary at this point, let me make an effort to make
sure that my points are understood:
(1)

I was asked to stipulate to the ownership

of properties that I do not own at this time. These
properties have been additionally included to arrive
at $1,700,000 marital estate value, and they were
not included in Faux's decree.
(2)

There are three points of law that the

affirmation does not dispense with:
(a) An illegal judgment against Holidair
who was not a party to a divorce.
(b)

The unenforceability of the delivery

of 14 apartments, 7 of which I don't own.
(c)

The illegality of the delivery of Major

Enterprises Stock as a security measure.
(Five)

My one last and significant point is a point

of marital estate evaluation and is distinct from the principle
of additional inclusion of properties.

When these two principles,

inclusion and evaluation, are taken and worked together, it
is possible to create an illusion of $1,700,000 marital estate
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net worth.

This is at the heart of the dilemma of my case

and where I feel the most grossly misunderstood as I tried
to explain to Judge Taylor and this Court.
On pages 38 and 39 of the respondent's brief, the
respondent's attorney states that Judge Taylor made an evaluation
of Major Enterprises stock by the employment of the deadlock
statute.

Is this a legally permissible conclusion if there is

no deadlock possibility?

(See stockholder agreement contained

in sealed brown envelope submitted by defendants counsel after
the preparation of abstract of record.)

To the detriment of my

interest, this resulted in a $343,000 evaluation error.

This

error, if coupled with inclusion errors, became the means by which
an additional $1,500,000 of artificial value was created on paper
and accounts in substantial part for the difference of $225,000
marital estate evaluation arrived at in the Faux decree.
Departing from nprocedure for a moment, if I may,
I would like to state that in my opinion that evaluation was
too low and now, in hindsight, I can see that an adjustment should
have been made but an apprisal evaluation of $1,700,000 is
equally bad and the degree of its badness exceeds by far the
badness of the Faux evaluation.

The degree of that badness

will likely keep spawning antagonisms into the future.

This

affirmation ruling has not addressed itself to that issue and
accordingly does not effectively put this case to rest, even
now.

Can this court explain to me why this is a "proper" finding?
I feel that in dividing up the ocean, I have been given

the bottom half and that the $200,000 gesture referred to in the
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last paragraph of the affirmation ruling, when taken into account
with the inclusion of the Seegmiller piece of property is as
fictitiously generous as it is fictitious in its origin.
An answer to the question, Was Taylor entitled to make
an evaluation of Major Enterprises stock on the basis of a
deadlock statute if there in fact could be no

!?

corporate deadlock",

would do a great deal to expose what has really gone on in the
Taylor hearing.

He never understood this distinction, even with

"close proximity observation".

Again, I tried to bring this

to his attention as a legitimate basis of why I felt in good
conscience I had to withdraw my stipulation.
Gentlemen of the august Supreme Court of the State of
Utah, if you do nothing else, please comment to this issue, as I
have grown unusually.weary from asking this highly germane question.

The affirmation ruling, it seems to me, has missed this

"deadlock statute" dimension entirely, and I believe it to be
a significant point of law.
Esteemed and honorable gentlemen of the Court, if the
December 16, 1975 affirmative ruling in its first two pages
establishes a "tone" or, if you will, a "slant" that Judge Faux
had the insight to provide a kind of protective device in his
decree, in those two pages it is assumed from the beginning
that the protection somehow was there for the exclusive benefit
of the defendant.
Perhaps he meant that interpretation be employed.
Again, I am not sure, I am just confused.

I know he said this,

and I see no reference to it in the ruling, and it may be
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deserving of some comment.
In the Memorandum Decision, preliminary to the preparation of the Findings of Fact of the final Faux decree, on page
27,, the following comment by Judge Faux appears:
I have had difficulty settling upon defendant's
proposal of dividing the various properties between
the parties as the safe and equitable means of disposing of the economic problems involved. Frequently
such a division is a satisfactory plan. I am now
convinced that division of the interest in the corporate entities will result in destruction of the
whole complex which has had unusual growth, to a large
extent, because of plaintiff's business courage, foresight and decisiveness. I prefer to adopt a plan
more promising of continued growth.
Again, on page 43 of the Abstract of Record in Judge
FauxTs "Findings" and "Conclusions", he stated:
4. That Plaintiff is awarded as his sole and
separate property all other properties of whatsoever
nature not awarded defendant in the foregoing paragraph.
which as I read and understand gave me the right to purchase the
Seegmiller property.
This affirmative ruling, it seems to me, has the effect
of the exact opposite of the implied intent of the now retired
Judge and to suggest otherwise is again difficult for me to
comprehend.
One last question, gentlemen:

if this "affirmation"

and "judgment" accomplishes what it purports to do, namely to
grant to the plaintiff a "larger share", that he should have no
reason to complain, let the author of this affirmative ruling
ask the defendant's counsel to demonstrate once and for all,
orally or in writing, where rebuttle is possible, one item,
including even my $24,000 annual salary, that the present decree
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at the time of its issuance, December 16, 1975, grants to the
plaintiff that doesnft have at least one of the following elements :
CI)

The value is other than what has been

represented.
C2)

That it has been paid for with funds developed

after the marriage,
(3) That it is so encumbered that as a practical
matter it is not functionable in the practice of the
plaintiff's trade.
(4) Or that it in fact does not even exist at
all.
(5)

Or that does not have the strong likelihood

of being lost by reason of foreclosure or withering
away because of excessively high interest rates — this
contrasted to the reverse being the case in what the
defendant has been granted.
In conclusion, most esteemed gentlemen, please accept
my humble inquiries as prompted by an effort on my part to
accept emotionally and psychologically the imponderables that this
affirmation ruling imposes.

This decision seems to have the effect

of not granting me a divorce from the nature of the things that
I was trying to separate myself from, namely the continuing
assertion of power and influence over my life that I concluded
four and one-half years ago was unbearable and undeserved.
Respectfully submitted,
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